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ABSTRACT
Social cognition was evaluated among subgroups of schizophrenics from stories
told to the Picture Arrangement (PA) subtest o f the Wechsler Adult Intelligence ScaleRevised (WAIS-R). PA stories were scored on six measures that were developed to
measure social cognition. Symptom ratings were made using the Scale for the
Assessment of Negative Symptoms (SANS) and the Scale for the Assessment of Positive
Symptoms (SAPS) and evaluated on three dimensions: negative, disorganized, and
psychotic. Of the three syndromal dimensions only disorganized symptoms were
predictive of scores on the PA derived measures. When IQ subtest scale scores (PA) were
entered into a regression equation with disorganization scores however, the IQ subtest
scores were the only significant predictors of all but two social cognition scales. Further
research should be conducted to determine if social cognition measures assess more than
general cognitive ability.

Social Cognition and Schizophrenia Syndromes
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INTRODUCTION
Schizophrenia is a debilitating illness that impacts all aspects of the lives of those
affected by it. Researchers have long sought to understand the etiology of schizophrenia,
to appropriately categorize its symptoms and to develop effective methods of treatment.
Recently there has been a growing body of research that suggests the applicability of a
social cognition model for understanding schizophrenia. Social cognition has been found
to be relevant to the understanding and treating of other mental disorders, particularly
depression and anxiety (Abramson, 1988; Dobson & Kendall, 1993). As social
dysfunction is one of the primary symptoms of schizophrenia a social cognitive approach
to the understanding and treatment of the disorder is particularly relevant (American
Psychiatric Association, DSM-IV, 1994).
Frith, (Corcoran, Mercer & Frith, 1995; Frith & Corcoran, 1996; Corcoran, Cahill
& Frith, 1997) and Hardy-Bayle (Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, Nadel, Chevalier & Widloecher,
1997; Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, Besche & Widloecher, 1997; Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, Brunet &
Widloecher, 1999) have conducted research on how theory of mind (ToM), may be an
underlying construct of social cognition, and how deficiencies of ToM relate to particular
symptoms of schizophrenia. This study will expand on these findings by considering
ToM as well as additional aspects of social cognition as they relate to syndromal patterns
of schizophrenia. A measure of social cognition will be derived from ratings of stories
told to the Picture Arrangement subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale- Revised
(WAIS-R; Wechsler, 1981).
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“Many people with schizophrenia experience disabilities in several domains of
social functioning, such as interpersonal relationships, self-care skills, education, work
and personal achievement, finances, housing, recreation, physical health and wellness,
mental health and drug abuse, spirituality, and legal matters” (Corrigan & Penn, 2001, p.
4). As compared to both clinical (affective disordered patients) and nonclinical control
groups, individuals with schizophrenia demonstrate deficits on measures of social skills
including a role-play test of social skills, a social adjustment scale, and a quality of life
scale (Bellack, Morrison, Wixted, & Muesser, 1990). These deficits are generally stable
over time and typically do not significantly improve simply as a result of improvements
in specific symptoms. Mueser, Bellack, Douglas, and Morrison (1991) found that when
comparing individuals with schizophrenia to non-psychiatric controls on measures of
social skills using a role play test, 67% of schizophrenics fell below the range of scores
for the controls at initial assessment and 64% were below the range one year later.
Often in conjunction with an individual’s difficulty with social functioning he or
she may withdraw from society, friends, and family, decreasing his or her level of social
and emotional support. This can often lead to an exacerbation of symptoms. In addition,
poor social interaction skills often limit the number of people a person with schizophrenia
has available to rely on for support. Although it is generally accepted by mental health
professionals that social skills training is an important component of rehabilitation for
individuals with schizophrenia there is conflicting evidence of the effectiveness of such
interventions (Morrison & Bellack, 1981). This conflicting evidence may be a result of
the fact that deficits in social interactions are indicative of problems at one stage of
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cognitive processing, i.e. stimuli perception, and social skills training addresses the
behaviors that may represent a different stage, i.e. response.
A great deal of research has been done assessing the ability of people with
schizophrenia to accurately perceive and identify the emotional expressions of others.
Penn, Combs, and Mohamed (2001) present a summary of many years of research on this
topic concluding the following: schizophrenics generally show deficits in facial-affect
perception; they demonstrate greater deficits for negative compared to positive facial
expressions; and it may be the case that individuals with paranoid, as compared to
nonparanoid, schizophrenia show less difficulty with facial-affect perception, although
this is only based on limited findings. Penn et al. (2001) have also considered research
that has evaluated how this impairment in facial-affect perception relates to social
functioning. Fewer studies have been completed in this area of research but the results
indicate that deficits in facial-affect perception are related to ward behavior, particularly
difficulty with hygiene, grooming, social competence, social interest, and neatness.
The perceptual deficits associated with schizophrenia are not limited to
interpretation of facial-affect. Penn et al (2001) reduced the large amount of research in
this area to two major findings, “people with schizophrenia tend to be impaired in their
perception of dynamic emotional displays... [and] have particular difficulty in discerning
abstract, rather than concrete cues” (p. 102). Toomey (1997) specifically considered the
relationship between nonverbal social perception and other areas of social functioning
and found that individuals with schizophrenia as compared to normal controls performed
significantly worse on tasks of social problem solving, social sequencing, and social
judgment. Nonverbal social perception skills were significantly related to all social
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problem-solving skills, as well as to performance on the Picture Arrangement and
Comprehension tasks of the WAIS-R (measures of sequencing and interpersonal
interactions and knowledge of practical information and social conventions,
respectively).
In summary, evidence strongly suggests a deficit in the perceptual abilities of
individuals with schizophrenia, particularly in relation to socially related stimuli. The
question remains, however, whether this difficulty is with actual perceptions or with the
cognitive processing of these perceptions. Improved understanding of the relationship
between social cognition and the symptoms o f schizophrenia may aid in understanding
this question and developing targeted interventions to improve social cognitive deficits
and by extension social functioning.
Social cognition has been defined as “the processes and functions that allow a
person to understand, act on, and benefit from the interpersonal world” (Corrigan &
Penn, 2001, p. 3). More specifically, Broks (1997) operationally defined social cognition
as: “(1) the perception of the dispositions and intentions of other individuals; (2) the
construction and maintenance of a viable concept of self; (3) the production and
regulation o f behavior in social contexts” (p. 107). Many individuals with schizophrenia
have difficulties with aspects of social cognition and are unable to internalize others’
points of view (Diamond, 1956).
The ability to discern that others have minds and act in accordance with the
contents of their minds has been described as theory of mind (ToM; Frith, 1992). Without
thinking we use this theory of mind on a regular basis whenever we interact with others.
We use this ability when we infer the intentions of someone else despite the content of
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their verbal communication; when we recognize that someone is lying or deceiving us;
and when we participate in pretend mental activity. Frith (1992) explains that the reason
we are able to do this without becoming hopelessly confused is because there are two
separate mechanisms for mental representations. The first mechanism handles primary
representations that have to do with the physical world. Propositions at this level can be
objectively determined to be true or false. The second mechanism deals with
metarepresentations that concern mental states. This refers to an understanding of our
own and others’ mental states. This is a subjective understanding and therefore cannot be
objectively determined as true or false. Frith (1992) uses an example of pretend play to
explain this distinction. Frith explains,
During the first years of life, a child must learn about the properties of objects; for
example, that a banana is yellow, curved, nice to eat, but must be peeled first.
Then, at around 18 months, the child starts playing games of pretend. When the
mother pretends that a banana is a telephone, why does this not hopelessly
confuse everything the child has learned about bananas so far (p. 120)?
Primary representations are statements about the physical state of the banana, such as
“this banana is edible” (p. 120). This statement can either be true or false and applies to
all bananas. Metarepresentations, on the other hand, regard the attitude that is being held
toward the banana, that “I pretend, this banana, it is a telephone” (p. 120). This statement
cannot be evaluated as either true or false and it does not apply universally to all bananas.
The child would need to use this metarepresentation to understand the intention of the
mother, i.e., that she is pretending.
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It is widely accepted that people with autism or Asperger’s syndrome lack a ToM
and thus cannot use metarepresentations. It is argued that these individuals lack the
capacity to recognize that others have minds, a state that seems to result from a failure of
neurodevelopment (Corcoran, 2001). Frith (1992) proposes that people with
schizophrenia are similar to those with autism in that they both lack the ability to form
metarepresentations. The difference is, however, that most individuals with schizophrenia
did at one time (i.e. prior to their first breakdown) have functional use of this mechanism.
According to Frith (1992), “the autistic person has never known that other people have
minds. The schizophrenic knows well that other people have minds, but has lost the
ability to infer the contents of these minds: their beliefs and intentions” (p. 121). In
addition, the individual with schizophrenia will likely continue to infer the mental states
as he or she had done effectively earlier in life even though he or she now lacks the
mechanisms for metarepresentation. Predictably, this individual’s conclusions are
generally going to be incorrect.
Frith (1992) postulates that this deficit in the ability for metarepresentation
underlies all the widely varying features of schizophrenia. Specifically, Frith (1992)
explains that there are three types of cognitive impairments that characterize the primary
signs and symptoms of schizophrenia. The first is a lack of awareness of one’s own goals
and intentions. This is believed to lead to negative symptoms such as abulia or poverty of
will, alogia or poverty of words, and athymia or lack of feelings. This is thought to arise
as a result of disruption to the system causing a complete inability to represent intentional
behavior. This likely extends to a lack of awareness of others’ goals and intentions
leading to the social withdrawal so often seen in schizophrenia. It is also suggested that
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this is related to some of the positive symptoms. According to Corcoran (2001) “passivity
phenomena, such as delusions of control, thought insertion or withdrawal, and auditory
hallucinations, arise as a result of a failure at a point within the system when one’s own
intentions to act ought to be monitored” (p. 151). Auditory hallucinations, for example,
involve the failure of the self-monitoring system because when the person makes
inferences about the intentions and thoughts of others they are perceived as coming from
an external source (Corcoran et al., 1995). The second type of impairment is a failure to
take into account the state of knowledge of other people resulting in formal thought
disorder. This presents itself in symptoms such as neologisms and the overuse of pronoun
references. For example, in telling a story an individual with formal thought disorder may
use pronouns exclusively without ever qualifying to whom he or she is specifically
referring. The individual makes the mistake of presuming that the listener knows what the
speaker knows. The third type of cognitive impairment results from faulty awareness of
the intentions of others that often leads to mistaken beliefs as evidenced by delusions of
reference and persecution as well as delusions o f one’s thoughts being read. The
schizophrenic may become suspicious when he or she can no longer infer the intentions
of others and concludes that this is because the other person is trying to hide malevolent
intentions. The false belief that others can read one’s thoughts may simply be the result of
others using their intact ToM to correctly infer the intentions of the schizophrenic
(Corcoran, 2001). Frith (1992) utilizes the ToM hypothesis as a way of understanding
and categorizing the symptoms of schizophrenia in terms of the social cognitive deficits
that underlie them.
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Sub-grouping o f Symptoms
The categorization of the symptoms of schizophrenia has long been, and
continues to be, a very difficult task because often the classifications do little to reduce
heterogeneity within the diagnostic groups. The DSM-IV (1994) continues to use
diagnostic categories based on the studies of Kraepelin (1950) and Bleuler (1950) despite
their poor predictive validity, particularly regarding prediction of response to treatment
(Andreasen & Grove, 1986). Hughling-Jackson’s neurological concepts of positive and
negative symptoms have been applied to the understanding of schizophrenia (as cited in
Andreasen & Grove, 1986). In this case, positive symptoms refer to the presence of
functions not evident in a healthy individual or exaggerations of normal functions (e.g.
hallucinations and delusions). Negative symptoms refer to the absence or deficit of
functions generally present in healthy individuals (e.g. poverty of content and avolition).
Crow (1982) has suggested that this distinction actually represents two separate
syndromes rather than uncorrelated symptom dimensions. One syndrome, in his view, is
the result of a neurochemical disturbance (i.e. positive symptoms) and the other is the
result of structural changes in the brain (i.e. negative symptoms). Crow (1982) arrived at
this conclusion based on the convergence o f several lines of research. First, Crow (1982)
considered the findings from brain imaging studies indicating that in some individuals
affected by schizophrenia there is an increase in ventricular size. According to Crow
(1982), “within the patient group, increased ventricular size was associated with
intellectual impairment as in the case of dementia. It was also associated with the
presence of negative symptoms” (p.352). Next Crow (1982) considered that in some
individuals the disease might remit or respond to treatment with neuroleptic medications.
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Among this group Crow reports that the medications were selective to positive symptoms
and that negative symptoms were generally not present. In the cases where negative
symptoms were present they did not respond to the medication. Neuroleptic drugs are
dopamine antagonists suggesting that positive symptoms may be the result of dysfunction
in the dopamine system. Crow (1982) concluded that positive symptoms reflect a
neurochemical disturbance most likely involving the dopaminergic pathways whereas;
negative symptoms are the result of a degenerative process involving cell death and
ultimately leading to changes in ventricular size and structural abnormalities of the brain.
Crow (1982) suggested that the negative symptom syndrome is related to intellectual
impairment and poorer prognosis as a result of the potentially irreversible brain structural
changes.
Andreasen (1983; 1984) developed rating scales to measure positive and negative
symptoms. These are the Scale for Assessment of Negative Symptoms (SANS) and the
Scale for Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS). Initial studies using the SANS and
SAPS seemed to support the positive/negative subtyping of schizophrenia (Kulhara, Kota
& Joseph, 1986). It is of importance to note however that while ratings of the SANS
demonstrated high inter-rater reliability and internal consistency (above 0.70), the
internal consistency for the SAPS was less than 0.40 (Andreasen & Olsen, 1982;
Andreasen, 1982). Additional research indicated that the SANS and SAPS scales are
actually measures of three, rather than two separate symptom dimensions. The additional
component was a result o f splitting the positive symptom domain into two factors; one
composed of ratings of hallucinations and delusions and the other bizarre behavior and
formal thought disorder. This distinction explains the low internal consistency of the
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SAPS (Arndt, Alliger & Andreasen, 1991). Additional studies and a re-analysis of
published SANS and SAPS ratings support the grouping of symptoms of schizophrenia
into three independent groups: Hallucinations/Delusions (Psychotic dimension), Positive
Thought Disorder and Bizarre Behavior (Disorganized dimension) and Negative
Symptoms (Andreasen, Ardnt, Alliger, Miller & Flaum, 1995; Klimidis, Stuart, Minas,
Copolov & Singh, 1993; Liddle, 1987; Minas et al., 1992).
Relationship between Cognition, Social Functioning, and Sub-groupings
Several lines of evidence suggest that the symptom sub-groupings are
differentially related to cognitive and social abilities. While both negative and
disorganized symptoms are related to impaired performance on measures of cognitive
functions, individuals with a predominance of disorganized symptoms appear to evidence
the greatest impairment in both cognitive and social functioning. Individuals with mostly
positive symptoms show the fewest deficits. Rowe and Shean (1997) conducted an
experiment to evaluate the ability for individuals with schizophrenia to improve their
performance on the Wisconsin Card Sort Test (WCST) with coaching and incentives.
They reported that individuals with a predominance of negative or psychotic symptoms
were able to improve their WCST performance following coaching instructions and
provision of small monetary incentives. Individuals with a predominance of symptoms of
disorganization, however, were not able to improve their performance even with explicit
coaching instructions and incentives. An additional study by Shean, Burnett, and Eckman
(2002) extended these findings by evaluating schizophrenics performance on a battery of
neuropsychological tests including the digit span, digit vigilance, logical memory, and
Trails A and B. Participants were tested and then provided with instructions on how to

12
improve their performance and retested. Symptoms of disorganization were associated
with a lack of improvement following instruction showing only minimal improvement in
performance on the digit vigilance, logical memory, and Trails A and B tests. Negative
symptoms were also associated with a lack of improvement, but only on the logical
memory task. Psychotic symptoms were related to improved post-instruction
performance. The authors suggest, “it may be that the disorganization symptoms
themselves functioned to interfere with attentional processes; as a result, participants did
not attend to or process the instructions. An alternative interpretation is that these
symptoms reflect dysfunctions in neural systems that are needed to perform effectively
these cognitive tasks” (Shean et al., 2002; p. 729).
Research by Walker and Harvey (1986) and Comblatt, Lenzenweger, Dworkin,
and Erlenmeyer-Kimling (1985) supported the proposition that impairments of attentional
processes are associated with symptoms of disorganization. Walker and Harvey (1986)
evaluated attentional performance using a digit-span task and demonstrated that high
ratings of disorganized symptoms were inversely related to performance on the
distraction condition of the task. Attentional and information-processing deficits were
also tested by Comblatt et al. (1985) using the Information Overload task under three
distraction conditions. Condition one involved no distraction, condition two used
undifferentiated background noise, and condition three had a male voice reciting stories
in the background that the participants were told they would later have to answer
questions about. Positive symptoms were related to distraction, whereas negative
symptoms were associated with lowered processing capacity. It is important to note that
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in this study the positive symptom category was not divided into the psychotic and
disorganization sub-groupings.
Additional research has been conducted evaluating the relationship between
symptom sub-groups and social abilities. Brekke, DeBonis, and Graham (1994)
compared social functioning, assessed on the Community Adjustment Form, among the
three symptom dimensions. Generally, disorganized and negative symptoms were more
strongly correlated with impaired social functioning. Specifically, disorganized
symptoms were negatively related to days worked, quality of friendships, social
satisfaction, and social competence and negative symptoms were negatively related to
days worked, quantity, frequency, and quality of friendships, social satisfaction, and
social competence. Positive symptoms were only related to poorer quality o f friendships
and less social satisfaction. Research by Liddle (1987) examined the association between
symptoms, self-care, occupation, and social function. The disorganization factor and the
negative symptoms factor were related to greater impairment in the areas assessed.
Disorganization was significantly related to the greatest number of impairments, namely:
poor grooming and hygiene, impersistence at work, and social inattentiveness. Negative
symptoms were related to problems with physical anergia and relationships with friends
and peers. The positive symptoms factor did not correlate significantly with any
functioning area. This body of research comparing symptom sub-groups and their
relationship to general and social cognitive skills presents a consistent picture in which
individuals with a predominance of disorganized symptoms demonstrate significant
impairments. The social and cognitive skills of those who experience negative symptoms
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are also often impaired, while individuals with psychotic symptoms of hallucinations and
delusions appear to be only mildly impaired.
Measures o f Social Cognition
Several paradigms have been developed to assess ToM in relation to the
symptoms of schizophrenia. Corcoran et al. (1995) developed a task to assess the ability
to “infer the real intentions behind indirect speech utterances” (p. 7). The test was
composed of 10 passages each of which describes the interactions of two characters. At
the end of the passage one of the characters drops an obvious hint and the participant is
asked what the character really meant by it. This is known as the hinting task.
Performance on this task by people with schizophrenia was poorer than that of normal
controls. When specific symptoms of schizophrenia were assessed individuals with
symptoms of disorganization scored most poorly followed by those with negative
features and then people with paranoid delusions. Frith and Corcoran (1996) utilized a
second measure of ToM in which participants heard stories that contained false beliefs or
deceptions and were simultaneously shown cartoon pictures corresponding to the story.
Following the story, participants were asked one memory question that required recalling
a piece of the story and one question that required inferring the mental state of one o f the
characters. The primary finding of this research was that individuals with paranoid
delusions were most impaired on the mental state questions as compared to those with
passivity symptoms (i.e., delusions of control or reference, thought insertion, thought
withdrawal and/or second person auditory hallucinations in the absence of paranoid
symptoms) and normal controls. Individuals with behavioral symptoms (e.g., poverty of
speech, flattening of affect, social withdrawal, incoherent speech, and incongruity of
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affect) also had difficulty with the mental state questions, but this appeared to be related
to memory impairments. A third method was devised to test ToM using joke cards
(Corcoran, et al., 1997). In this study there were two sets of 10 joke cards. One set of
cards had jokes that were behavioral in nature (i.e. slapstick type comedy). The other set
of cards had jokes that required the inference of the character’s mental state to “get it”.
The participants were then asked to explain each joke. Individuals with schizophrenia had
the most difficult time explaining the mental state jokes. Specifically, the behavioral
signs group, those with paranoid symptoms, and the passivity features subgroup all
demonstrated the most marked impairment. Although the cumulative results of this
research seem to indicate that different symptoms affect ToM tasks in particular ways,
results do not consistently demonstrate which symptom patterns are related to poorer
performance on ToM tasks. Sarfati et al. (1997a; 1997b; 1999) devised a slightly
different type of ToM task in which participants were asked to read a comic strip and
then select one of two (Sarfati et al., 1997a) or three (Sarfati et al., 1997b; 1999) answer
cards that most logically complete the sequence. Individuals with thought and language
disorders (disorganized symptoms) (Sarfati et al., 1997a; 1997b; 1999) as compared to
those with other symptoms showed the most impairment in their ability to attribute
intentions and false beliefs to characters in the comic strip.
The Picture Arrangement (PA) subtest of the WAIS-R has been identified as a
potentially useful measure o f “intelligence relevant to social functioning” (Lipsitz,
Dworkin, & Erlenmeyer-Kimling, 1993; p. 430) because o f its socially relevant content.
According to Ott et al. (1998) the PA subtest “assesses the subject’s ability for perceptual
organization and sequencing, to distinguish essential from non-essential details in a social
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context, and requires integrated brain functioning” (p. 4). The task in the PA subtest
involves presenting a series of cards to the participant in a mixed up sequence and then
requesting that the participant rearrange the cards so that the pictures tell a logical story.
Toomey, Wallace, Corrigan, Schuldberg, and Green (1997) found differences on PA
scores for individuals with schizophrenia as compared to normal controls.
Westen and Segal (1990) developed a methodology to study social cognition
using stories told to the Picture Arrangement (PA) subtest of the WAIS-R. Having the
participant “tell the story” adds a projective component that “allows clinicians to draw
inferences about the way patients experience people and relationships from the content of
their stories” (p. 1). In this case the participant is instructed to rearrange the pictures and
then to “tell the story” they used in the organization of the cards. Utilizing these
additional measures one can gather information regarding the participants understanding
of the cards even if they do not arrange them in the correct order. Considering the
arrangement alone leads to two potential problems, first, that the participant may have
arranged the cards in the correct order, but did not really understand the relations between
the cards; or second, that the participant has arranged the cards in the wrong order but has
a reasonable and logical story to go along with the arrangement. This measure appears to
hold promise as a means of assessing the relationship between symptom syndromes and
aspects of social cognition
Westen and Segal (1990) have developed a scoring system using performance on
the WAIS-R PA subtest to measure social cognition. They have presented evidence of
satisfactory levels of interrater reliability and convergent and discriminant validity for six
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measures of social cognition and object relations derived from PA stories. The six
dimensions are:
[1] Episode integration (the capacity to derive a coherent and integrated account
of events), [2] accuracy o f causal attributions (the capacity to attribute plausible
causes of events), [3] affect-tone of relationship paradigms (the degree to which
described relationships or interactions are characterized by benevolent, neutral, or
malevolent affective quality), [4] capacity for emotional investment in
relationships and moral standards (the extent to which relationships are defined in
other than need-gratifying terms), [5] complexity of representation, and [6] the
accuracy of character ascription (the extent to which people are perceived
accurately and without significant idiosyncratic intrusions) (Segal, Westen, Lohr,
& Silk, 1993, p. 59).
Interrater reliabilities for the six scales were as follows: Episode Integration, .84;
Accuracy of Causal Attributions, .82; Affect-Tone of Relationship Paradigms, .90;
Capacity for Emotional Investment in Relationships and Moral Standards, .90;
Complexity of Representations, .96; and Accuracy of Character Ascriptions, .89 (Segal et
al., 1993). Each measure can be reliably rated from stories using a scoring manual
developed by Westen and Segal (1990).
Segal and colleagues used this methodology to assess social cognition and object
relations in individuals with borderline personality disorder, depression and normal
comparison individuals (Segal, Westen, Lohr, Silk & Cohen, 1992; Segal et al., 1993).
Segal et al. (1993) found that PA scores correlated with Social Adjustment Scale scores.
In particular Episode Integration, Accuracy o f Causal Attributions, and Emotional
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Investment mean scores correlated significantly with Social Adjustment total mean
scores. Research utilizing these six scales indicated that mean PA subscale scores
significantly distinguished between pathological samples (i.e. borderline patients and
depressed patients) and normal controls (Segal et al., 1992; 1993).
Current Study
This research will test the ability of Westen and Segal’s (1990) WAIS-R PA
derived measures o f social cognition to distinguish between the three syndromal groups
of schizophrenia (negative, disorganized, and psychotic), as defined by Andreasen and
others (Andreasen et al., 1995; Klimidis et al., 1993; Liddle, 1987; Minas et al., 1992),
and bipolar disordered participants. Participants will be rated on each of the three
syndromal dimensions of schizophrenia in order to reduce heterogeneity within samples.
Individuals with bipolar disorder were selected as a psychotic comparison group.
Although at times people with bipolar disorder may present with psychotic symptoms
that appear similar to those of schizophrenia, the illnesses are believed to represent two
distinct diseases with different underlying pathologies. Research evaluating differences in
information processing among schizophrenia and bipolar disordered participants
indicated that a computerized battery o f information processing tasks correctly classified
75.5% o f the cases (Tam, Sewell & Deng, 1998). It is anticipated that bipolar individuals
will approximate the demographics of those with schizophrenia, but will evidence less
impairment on social cognitive processes.
In this study the PA measures o f social cognition will be related to symptom
patterns. It is hypothesized that individuals with a predominance of disorganized
symptoms will demonstrate the greatest impairments of social cognition as evidenced by
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lower scores on the six PA measures. In addition, participants with DSM-IV diagnosis of
bipolar disorder will perform better then all other syndromal groups on social cognition
measures. It is further predicted that diagnosis and symptom ratings will be related to
performance on the PA social cognition tasks independent of WAIS-R PA scale score
estimates of general intelligence.
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METHODS
Participants
Participants were identified from the patient population of a large psychiatric
hospital in Virginia. Patients were invited to participate in the study if they met the
following criteria: (1) primary DSM-IV (1994) diagnosis of schizophrenia,
schizoaffective disorder, or bipolar disorder, (2) under the age of 60, (3) no secondary
diagnosis of mental retardation or organic disorder, and (4) free of substance use for a
"N

minimum of two weeks. Patients were approached as soon as they were determined by
unit staff to be safe to go off of the ward and were able to provide informed consent. Of
the approximately 75 patients approached 47 agreed to participate and completed all
tasks. All participants provided informed consent. This group was comprised of 13
individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia, 16 diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder,
and 18 diagnosed with bipolar disorder. Thirty-seven of the participants were admitted
and evaluated in the acute inpatient facility and ten were residing and evaluated in the
long-term rehabilitation program. Twenty-one of the participants were male and 26 were
female. Their average age was 38.80. Participants were offered a soda or snack as
compensation for their participation.
Materials
The Wide Range Achievement Test-3 (WRAT-3, Wilkinson, 1993) Reading
subtest was administered to provide an estimate of premorbid IQ score (Johnstone,
Callahan, Kapila & Bouman, 1996). Evidence of sufficient reliability and validity of the
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WRAT-3 has been demonstrated (Snelbaker, Wilkinson, Robertson & Glutting, 2001).
The WRAT-3 requires the participant to read a row of letters and as many words as they
can from a list of 42.
The WAIS-R Picture Arrangement subtest was administered following the
methodology outlined by Westen and Segal (1990). Each participant was presented with
10 sets of picture cards (the first being a sample) in a mixed up order. The participant was
instructed to rearrange the cards so that they were in a logical sequential order.
Participants were timed, but there was no time limit enforced. After the cards were
arranged the participants were asked to “tell the story” they used in determining the card
sequence. The researcher wrote down the story as the participant was telling it. Coding of
the PA stories was completed following the guidelines specified by Westen and Segal
(1990) in the scoring manual.
Two coders scored the six measures of the PA stories. In order to become reliable
in this scoring each coder began by scoring eight sets of sample stories provided by
Westen and Segal (1990). With these sample stories Westen and Segal (1990) provided
written rationales for the scoring so that the coders could better understand the
application of the scoring guidelines. The first ten participants’ (1-10) PA stories were
subsequently scored by each coder independently. The coders then met and discussed
their scoring, further clarifying the guidelines. For measures the coders did not
consistently agree on the responses were discussed, in the context of the scoring manual,
until a consensus score was agreed upon. The agreed upon scores were then utilized in
analysis. The next ten participants’ (11-21) PA stories were also scored independently by
both coders and these scores were used to establish interrater reliability.
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An informal interview was conducted including questions from the SANS
(Andreasen, 1983) and SAPS (Andreasen, 1984). Ratings on the SANS and SAPS were
used to identify ratings on syndromal dimensions. Interviewers conducted interviews
together for the first seven participants, coded SANS and SAPS symptoms separately and
then compared ratings. Utilizing the guidelines for administration of the SANS and
SAPS, interviewers came to agreement on how symptoms would be coded. A modified
and abbreviated Premorbid Adjustment Scale (PAS; Gittelman-Klein & Klein, 1969) was
completed based on participant responses in the interview and hospital records.
Procedure
Names of potential participants were collected from current hospital census
records. These names were then reviewed by hospital clinical staff to determine
appropriateness for current participation. Patients who met the criteria to be taken off the
ward were identified and later approached by the interviewer or by the interviewer and a
hospital psychologist and invited to participate in the study. At this time the individual
was provided with a brief verbal description of the interview and tasks and notified of the
soda/snack incentive. For those patients who agreed to participate the interviewer
escorted them to a private meeting room and began the study. The participant was first
presented with the informed consent agreement. The participant was given the option to
read the form or have it read to them. The interviewer confirmed that the individual
understood the agreement prior to signing.
Each interview began with administration of the WRAT-3. The instructions for
the WRAT-3 were explained as specified in the manual (Wilkinson, 1993). Individuals
were instructed to read the letters that were presented across the top of the page and then
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to read the words across each row. Participants were informed to do their best and try to
pronounce each word. Next the WAIS-R PA subtest was administered. The instructions
provided for this administration followed the guidelines set out in the WAIS-R manual
(Wechsler, 1981). The participant was presented with the first set of cards, the practice
set, and instructed to rearrange the cards so that they tell a story. If the participant had
difficulty with the practice set the researcher demonstrated how the cards should be
arranged, then the cards were put back in the original order and the participant was asked
to try again. Once the participant had arranged the first set of cards correctly the
researcher explained that the participant would be asked to tell the story they used in the
arrangement of the cards. For the practice set the researcher provided a sample story. The
participant was then presented with the second set of cards and instructed to rearrange the
cards so that they tell a story and to indicate to the researcher when the cards were in the
arrangement they wanted. The participant would then be asked to tell the story they used
in the arrangement of the cards. This procedure was repeated for the remainder of the
card sets. Finally, the test session concluded with the informal interview. The informal
interview involved the researcher asking the participant questions about how they were
currently feeling, what brought them into the hospital, if they were feeling differently
then when they first came to the hospital, as well as some personal history questions (e.g.,
when they were first hospitalized, if they were married or had children, etc). The
interviewer pursued fiirther any answers that provided information about symptoms the
participant experienced. When the interview was completed the participant was asked if
he or she had any questions. The interviewer answered all questions and the participant
was taken back to the ward. The duration o f interview sessions ranged from
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approximately 30 minutes to one and one-half hours. The majority of interviews were
completed in 45 minutes. After the interview session was completed the researcher
examined the participants’ medical chart for demographic information and confirmation
of social history information.
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RESULTS
Demographic and clinical information for all participants is presented in Table 1.
An ANOVA was performed on these variables to identity any significant differences
between diagnostic groups. There was a significant difference on Premorbid Adjustment
scores, F(2, 44) = 3.70,p = .03. Post hoc analysis using Tukey’s HSD procedure
indicated that individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder had significantly higher
premorbid adjustment scores than individuals diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder,
mean difference = -1.52, p< .03.
SANS and SAPS global symptom ratings for each participant were combined to
create the three syndromal dimension scores: the global rating for negative symptoms
was used to form the negative symptom score, the sum of the global ratings for delusions
and hallucinations were used to create the psychotic symptoms score, and the sum of the
global ratings for formal thought disorder and bizarre thoughts and behaviors was
calculated to create the disorganized symptoms score. The syndrome groupings were
analyzed as continuous variables since most of the participants evidenced symptoms of
more than one of the syndromes. Each participant has a score for all three syndromal
dimensions. The syndromal dimensions did not significantly correlate with each other
confirming that they are assessing distinct sets of symptoms.
The first twenty participants’ PA stories were double-coded independently by two
coders. Each of the coders had been trained using the detailed scoring manuals provided
by Westen and Segal (1990). Of the first twenty participants’ PA stories the scoring of
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the last ten participants’ stories were used to establish interrater reliability. Reliability of
the Capacity for Emotional Investment could not be computed because there was no
variance in the scores. However, both judges had perfect agreement in their coding of this
scale. Reliability for the remaining five PA derived measures scales was computed using
Pearson’s r. Correlations were computed comparing each coders ratings on the six
derived measures for each of the PA stories. The average of the correlations was
computed across stories for each scale. The mean reliabilities for the scales were as
follows: Integration of Episodes, .74; Accuracy of Causal Attributions, .67; Affect-Tone
of Relationship, .93; Complexity of Representations, .78; and Accuracy of Character
Ascriptions, .76.
The intercorrelations of the six PA derived measures are presented in Table 2.
Correlations were significant for Integration of Episodes and Accuracy of Causal
Attribution, Complexity of Representations and Affect-Tone of Relationship, Accuracy
of Character Ascriptions and Affect-Tone, and Accuracy o f Character Ascription and
Complexity of Representations. Internal consistency was evaluated for the six scales. The
standardized inter-item alphas were as follows: Integration of Episodes, .81; Accuracy of
Causal Attribution, .63; Affect-Tone of Relationship, .48; Capacity for Emotional
Investment, .94; Complexity of Representations, .57; and Accuracy of Character
Ascription, .43. Findings were similar to those reported by Segal et al. (1993) with the
exception of Complexity of Representations being substantially lower (Segal et al.
reported .73) and Accuracy of Character Ascription moderately lower (Segal et al.
reported .58).
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Syndromal Dimensions Results
Standard multiple regressions were run on scores of each of the six PA derived
measures, the mean of the PA derived measures and the standard PA scale score with
scores on the three syndromal dimensions and premorbid adjustment ratings entered as
predictors. The disorganized syndrome dimension was a significant predictor of
performance for Integration of Episodes, t = -1.95,/? < .05, partial r = -.29, Affect-Tone
of Relationship, t = -2.39, p < .05, partial r = -.35, Accuracy of Character Ascriptions, t =
-236, p < .05, partial r = -.35, and mean PA derived measures, t —-2.04,p < .05, partial r
= -.30. Premorbid adjustment rating was a significant predictor of performance for PA
scale scores, t = 2.01 ,P < .05. partial r = .30. Neither the psychotic nor the negative
syndrome dimensions were predictive of performance on the PA derived measures, the
mean score of the PA derived measures, or the PA scale score.
Axis I Diagnosis Results
Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to test for differences
between Axis I diagnosis groups and the PA derived social cognition measures, average
social cognition score, and Wechsler IQ test PA sub-test scale score. Significant
differences were found among the Axis I diagnosis groups on Integration of Episodes,
F(2,44) = 3.85,/? < .05, Accuracy of Causal Attribution, F{2,44) = 4.10,/? < .05, mean
score of the PA derived measures, F(2,44) = 3.96, p < .05, and the PA scale score,
F(2,43) = 4.42,/? < .05. Post hoc analyses were done using Tukey’s HSD procedure to
identify specific group differences (see Table 3). Results indicated that individuals
diagnosed with bipolar disorder differed significantly from individuals with
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schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder, with bipolars consistently outperforming
schizophrenics and schizoaffectives.
Interactions between Symptoms, Diagnosis, and Overall Cognitive Ability
Correlations between the syndromal dimensions and the WRAT 3 and the WAISR PA scaled score were computed. The correlation was significant for disorganized
symptoms and the PA scale score, r = -30, p < .05, and approached significance for the
WRAT 3, r = -.25, p < .10. A significant difference was also observed between
diagnostic groups and performance on the PA scale score, F (2,43) = 4.42, p < .05, and
the difference approached significance for the WRAT 3, F{2,44) = 2.10,/? = .13.
Standard multiple regressions were run on scores of the six PA derived measures
and the mean of the PA derived measures with the WAIS-R PA scale scores and the
disorganized syndromal dimension as predictors. The regression equations indicated that
PA scale scores were the strongest predictors of performance on three of the PA derived
measures (i.e., Integration of Episodes, Accuracy of Causal Attributions, and Accuracy of
Character Ascriptions) and the mean o f the PA derived measures. Disorganized symptom
ratings remained the strongest predictor for Affect-Tone of Relationships and were
moderately predictive of Accuracy of Character Ascriptions (see Table 4).
A MANCOVA was performed to assess the effect the Picture Arrangement test
estimate of cognitive functioning had on the significant differences observed for several
PA measures and Axis I diagnosis. Axis I and gender were entered as the betweensubjects factors and PA scaled scores were entered as a covariate. After the general
cognitive scores were covaried there was no longer any significant difference among
Axis I diagnosis on the PA subscales. A second MANCOVA was run with Axis I
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diagnosis and gender entered as between-subject factors and WRAT scores entered as a
covariate. When differences on WRAT scores were controlled for there were no longer
any differences between Axis I diagnosis and performance on the PA subscales.
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DISCUSSION
The findings of this study support the hypothesis that disorganized symptoms are
related to impaired performance on measures o f social cognition. The disorganized
symptom dimension was a significant predictor of performance on several of the Picture
Arrangement derived social cognition measures, specifically, Integration of Episodes,
Affect-Tone of Relationships, Accuracy of Character Ascriptions, and the mean of the
PA derived measures. This finding supports prior research (Rowe & Shean 1997; Shean
et al. 2002) that symptoms o f disorganization are related to greater cognitive impairment.
Negative and psychotic syndrome dimensions were not predictive of performance on any
of the PA social cognition measures.
Axis I diagnosis was also related to the social cognition measures, with
individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder outperforming individuals with schizophrenia
and schizoaffective disorder. This finding supports clinical observations that people with
bipolar, when not in an active manic state, demonstrate generally intact social abilities.
Based on the behavior of bipolars, not acutely manic, it does not appear that their ToM
has been permanently compromised, thus allowing them to understand their own and
others’ mental states.
Although significant relationships between symptoms, diagnosis and social
cognition measures were observed, there was also an association between symptoms,
diagnosis and general cognitive functioning as measured by WAIS-R PA subtest scale
scores. Symptoms of disorganization were correlated with both the PA scale scores, an
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estimate of current cognitive functioning, and the WRAT 3, an estimate of premorbid
cognitive functioning. When the PA scale score estimate of cognitive functioning was
entered as an independent variable it became the sole predictor of social cognition scores
on all of the PA derived measures, except for the Affect-Tone of Relationships and the
Accuracy of Character Ascriptions subscales. Disorganized symptoms remained the most
significant predictor of performance for these subscales. When general cognitive
measures were evaluated as covariates there was no longer a significant difference among
Axis I diagnosis for social cognition measures.
Segal and Westen et al. (1992; 1993) did not correlate their PA derived measures
with general cognition tests so it is impossible to determine if the same interaction of
general and social cognition was present in their samples o f people with borderline
personality disorder, depression, and normal controls. It may be that the social cognition
measures are so heavily influenced by the general PA task that poor performance on the
general task of arranging the cards will result in low social cognition scores just by virtue
of the interaction between the two. Part of the reason for having the participants “tell the
story” was to allow the researcher to take into account appropriate stories despite
incorrect picture arrangement. In practice, however, it seemed that when the participant
was not able to put the cards in a relatively correct arrangement they were also unable to
tell a coherent story. The story was forced to follow the incorrect card arrangement
sometimes leading to disjointed and strange stories.
The correct card arrangement seemed to affect scores on some scales more than
others. This may explain why the Affect-Tone of Relationships and the Accuracy of
Character Ascription scales were not predicted by the general cognition measure. These
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two scales do not rely as heavily on the arrangement of the cards. The Affect-Tone of
Relationships scale is scored based on whether the participant ascribes malevolent or
idiosyncratic negativity to characters in the pictures. Generally participants did not
ascribe malevolence to the characters, but when they did it was often unrelated to the
correctness of the card arrangement. Similarly, the Accuracy of Character Ascription
scale measures the participants’ ability to attribute reasonable traits, thoughts, feelings, or
intentions to the characters. This can be done with the cards in virtually any order. On the
other hand, the Integration of Episodes scale measures that participants’ ability to tell a
coherent story. A story would receive a low score on this scale if they told the story card
by card and a high score if they formed an integrated plot. The ability to do this clearly
relies heavily on a reasonable arrangement of the cards. The Accuracy of Causal
Attributions is also greatly influenced by card arrangement as it measures how the
participant explains the causal links between actions in the cards. If the cards are not in
the correct order it becomes difficult to make reasonable causal explanations. In these
cases participants often left out explanations or created peculiar explanations to
compensate, both of which resulted in a lowered score. Based on this evidence the scales
that rely heavily on correct card sequence are going to be highly related to general
cognitive abilities as measured by PA scale scores, whereas those scales that are
relatively independent of card arrangement may be less influenced by general cognitive
performance.
Additionally, it is important to consider the role attention may play in the mutual
impairment of general and social cognition. As reported previously Walker and Harvey
(1986) and Comblatt et al. (1985) found that symptoms of disorganization were
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positively related to distraction. The findings of this study may be the result of impaired
attention negatively affecting performance on both general and social cognition tasks. An
individual with a predominance of disorganized symptoms may be unable to focus his or
her attention on the task resulting in lower test scores.
The effects of medications must always be considered when evaluating a
psychiatric population. Often participants’ antipsychotic medications are translated into
Thorazine equivalents so that they can be controlled for in statistical analyses. This study
did not lend itself to such measures, as many of the participants were prescribed
medications other than antipsychotics. Mood stabilizers were predominant either alone or
in combination with antipsychotics for many of the participants in this sample. When
medication effects cannot be controlled for there remains a possibility that the results
may have been influenced by the therapeutic and side effects of the medication.
Medications are more often prescribed in relation to symptoms present than diagnosis.
Perhaps individuals with a predominance of disorganized symptoms are more likely to be
prescribed medications that interfere with their ability to perform well on general and
social cognition tasks. For all of these reasons it is unclear what aspects of the symptoms
of disorganization are most responsible for impaired cognitive functioning, both general
and social.
Participants in this study were inpatients in a state psychiatric hospital who were
invited to voluntarily participate. The sample is inherently biased because of this self
selection process. Individuals who agreed to participate and were able to complete the
testing may not be representative of the general inpatient psychiatric population. For
example, individuals who were paranoid were often unwilling to be interviewed; those
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with severe negative symptoms could not motivate themselves enough to participate; and
people with severe symptoms of disorganization were unable to focus their attention long
enough on a task to complete even small portions of the testing session. Evidence of this
sampling bias may be demonstrated by the unusually high WRAT 3 scores for the
participants tested with 70% of participants scoring in the high school or above range and
21% scoring in the post high school range. Utilizing a larger sample size in future
research will not eliminate this bias, but it will reduce its effects and create a more
representative sample.
The primary goal of this study was to determine if the PA derived measures,
previously found to be predictive o f social cognition in people with borderline personality
disorder, could be utilized with a different psychiatric population know to have
impairments in ToM and social cognition. Based on the results of this study several
limitations of the PA measures when applied to this severe psychiatric population can be
addressed. First, one of the derived measures did not perform in the same manner for
these two populations, i.e. borderlines and schizophrenics. Westen and Segal et al. (1993)
reported the most consistent support for the validity of three of the scales, Integration of
Episodes, Accuracy of Causal Attributions, and Capacity for Emotional Investment. In
this study the Capacity for Emotional Investment scale provided minimal information, as
there was little variability of scores. This scale is designed to measure the participant’s
capacity to invest emotionally in people, relationships, morals, and ideals. The majority
o f participants’ stories did not indicate a deficiency in this capacity. This may suggest
that the Emotional Investment scale is not a relevant measure for individuals with
psychotic disorders.
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Second, the Accuracy of Character Ascriptions scale, as scored according to the
manual, did not seem to accurately portray performance. The Accuracy of Character
Ascriptions scale measures the participant’s description of the characters. It relies heavily
on the scoring of the previous scale, the Complexity of Representations. For the
Complexity of Representations scale participants are given a point for every emotion,
intention, thought, and trait that is ascribed to the character. This complexity is then
evaluated for accuracy in the following scale, i.e. the Accuracy of Character Ascriptions.
The problem with this is that while participants who give detailed descriptions of the
characters receive high Complexity scores they often receive lower Character Ascription
scores because their descriptions are idiosyncratic. Conversely, participants who provide
no description of the characters receive low Complexity scores, but high Character
Ascription scores, by default, because they did not attribute to the characters any
idiosyncratic traits. Therefore, participants who are just concretely describing what they
physically see in the cards will receive high Character Ascription scores even though they
have not ascribed any traits to the characters. This could possibly be resolved by adding
another scoring level reflecting that the participant did not provide any character
ascriptions.
Third, by having participants “tell the story” they used in arranging the cards a
projective component is added to the PA test. While a projective test is highly applicable
to evaluating individuals with personality disorders, it may not be as informative for
those with a psychotic disorder. During testing it was rare that a participant added much
more then was actually present in the cards. This may require a level of abstraction that
many individuals with psychotic disorders lack. When additional information was
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provided it was usually to try to compensate for incorrect card sequencing. On rare
occasions a participants’ delusion was projected onto the story. Differences in scores on
the PA derived measures seemed to result mostly from incorrect card arrangement and
therefore an incoherent story, not fully explaining the causal links between events in the
cards, and difficulty in moving beyond the concrete description of the pictures on the
cards.
In order to evaluate the usefulness of the PA derived measures of social cognition
for a psychotic population further research is warranted. As mentioned previously a
larger sample would need to be assessed in order to improve the representativeness of the
sample. In addition, the relationship between performance on general cognition tasks and
social cognition tasks needs to be considered further. It may also be that measuring social
cognition via picture cards requires too much abstraction for many individuals with
schizophrenia disorders and investigating another method of measurement could be
fruitful. Valuable information could be gathered from a study that assessed symptom
dimensions, several measures of general cognition, the PA subscale and its derived
measures, as well as a more real-life social cognition task. Others have utilized role-play
tests with a simulated social encounter to assess social skill level (Mueser, Bellack,
Morrison, & Wixted, 1990). Videotaped encounters similar to those presented in the PA
cards may provide a more ecologically valid assessment of social cognition. Results from
a more comprehensive study, such as the one discussed here, could lead to more
conclusive evidence regarding schizophrenia, its symptoms, and their effects on social
cognition.
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TABLE 1
DEMOGRAPHIC AND CLINICAL INFORMATION FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS
All Particip.

Schizophrenia

Schizoaffective

Bipolar

N

47

13

16

18

Gender
Male
Female

21
26

5
8

7
9

9
9

38.80 ±9.92

37.46 ± 10.41

37.75 ± 10.72

40.82 ± 8.99

3.72 ±3.76

3.69 ±4.27

3.50 ± 2.76

3.94 ±4.32

2.51 ±1.78

2.23 ±1.69

1.81 ± 1.60

3.33 ±1.75

26.80 ± 3.54

26.04 ±3.67

25.83 ±4.04

28.54 ±2.13

Age (M±SD)
Previous
Admissions
(.M±SD)
Premorbid
Adjustment
(M±SD)
MMSE (M±SD)
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TABLE 2
INTERCORRELATIONS OF THE SIX DERIVED PA MEASURES

Episode
Integration
Causal
Attributions
Affect-Tone
o f Relation.
Emotional
Investment

Episode
Integ.

Causal
Attrib.

AffectTone

Emotion
Invest.

Complex,
of Rep.

Character
Ascrip.

-

.75**

.19

.21

.17

.21

.18

.24

.23

.22

.07

.54**

_

.07

.05

Complexity
of Rep.

-.63**

Character
Ascriptions

-

* * p < .01
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TABLE 3
POST HOC COMPARISONS FOR AXIS I DIAGNOSIS AND PA SCORES
Schizophrenia

Bipolar

* p < .05

Schizoaffective

Mean
Difference

Sig.

Mean
Difference

Sig.

Integration of
Episodes

,39

.03*

.27

.14

Accuracy of
Causal
Attributions
Mean PA
Derived
Measures Score
PA Scaled
Score

.38

.03*

.29

.09

.16

.04*

.13

.07

1.81

.17

2.77

.02*
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TABLE 4
PREDICTION OF SOCIAL COGNITION FROM SYNDROMAL DIMENSIONS AND
GENERAL COGNITIVE ABILITIES
Significant
Predictor

t

P

Partial r

Integration of
Episodes

PA Scale
Score

5.13

.00

.62

Accuracy of Causal
Attributions

PA Scale
Score

3.45

.00

.47

Disorganized
Syndrome

-2.22

.03

-.32

2.01

.05

.30

-1.70

.10

-.25

4.70

.00

.59

Affect-Tone

Capacity for
Emotional Investment

None

Complexity of
Representations

None

Accuracy of Character
Ascriptions

Mean PA Derived
Measures Score

PA Scale
Score
Disorganized
Syndrome
PA Scale
Score

41

REFERENCES
Abramson, L.Y. (1988). Social Cognition and clinical psychology. New York: Guilford
Press.
American Psychiatric Association. (1994). Diagnostic and statistical manual o f mental
disorders (4th ed.). Washington, DC: Author.
Andreasen, N.C. (1982). Negative symptoms in schizophrenia: Definition and validation.
Archives o f General Psychiatry, 39, 784-788.
Andreasen, N.C. (1983). The scale fo r the assessment o f negative symptoms (SANS).
Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa.
Andreasen, N.C. (1984). The scale fo r the assessment ofpositive symptoms (SAPS). Iowa
City, IA: University of Iowa.
Andreasen, N.C., Arndt, S., Alliger, R., Miller, D., & Flaum, M. (1995). Symptoms of
schizophrenia. Archives o f General Psychiatry, 52, 341-351.
Andreasen, N.C., & Grove, W.M. (1986). Evaluation of positive and negative symptoms
in schizophrenia. Psychiatrie and Psychobiologie, 1, 108-121.
Andreasen, N.C., & Olsen, S. (1982). Negative versus positive schizophrenia: Definition
and validation. Archives o f General Psychiatry, 39, 789-794.
Arndt, S., Alliger, R.J., & Andreasen, N.C. (1991). The distinction of positive and
negative symptoms: The failure of a two-dimensional model. British Journal o f
Psychiatry, 158, 317-322.

Bellack, A.S., Morriaon, R.L., Wixted, J.T., & Mueser, K.T. (1990). An analysis of social
competence in schizophrenia. British Journal o f Psychiatry, 156, 809-818.
Bleuler, E. Dementia praecox or the group o f schizophrenias (J. Zinkin, Trans.). New
York: International Universities Press.
Brekke, J.S., DeBonis, J.A., & Grahman, J.W. (1994). A latent structure analysis of the
positive and negative symptoms in schizophrenia. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 35,
252-259.
Broks, P. (1997). Brain, self, and others: The neuropsychology of social cognition. In G.
Claridge (Ed.), Schizotypy: Implications for illness and health (pp. 98-123). New
%

York: Oxford University Press.
Corcoran, R. (2001). Theory of mind and schizophrenia. In P.W. Corrigan & D.L. Penn
(Eds.), Social cognition and schizophrenia (pp. 149-174). Washington, DC:
American Psychological Association.
Corcoran, R., Cahill, C, & Frith, C.D. (1997). The appreciation of visual jokes in people
with schizophrenia: A study of ‘mentalizing ability. Schizophrenia Research, 24,
319-327.
Corcoran, R., Mercer, G., & Frith, C.D. (1995). Schizophrenia, symptomatology and
social inference: Investigating “theory of mind” in people with schizophrenia.
Schizophrenia Research, 17, 5-13.
Comblatt, B.A., Lenzenweger, M.F., Dworkin, R.H., & Erlenmeyer-Kimling, L. (1985).
Positive and negative schizophrenic symptoms, attention, and information
processing. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 11, 397-407.

43
Corrigan, P.W., & Penn, D.L. (2001). Introduction: Framing models of social cognition
and schizophrenia. In P.W. Corrigan & D.L. Penn (Eds.), Social cognition and
schizophrenia (pp. 3-37). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Crow, T.J. (1982). Two syndromes in schizophrenia. Trend in Neurosciences, 5, 351-354.
Diamond, M.D. (1956). The ability of schizophrenics to modify responses in an
interpersonal situation. Journal o f Consulting Psychology, 20, 441-444.
Dobson, K.S., & Kendall, P.C. (Eds.). (1993). Psychopathology and cognition. San
Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Frith, C.D. (1992). The cognitive neuropsychology o f schizophrenia. Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Frith, C.D., & Corcoran, R. (1996). Exploring ‘theory o f mind’ in people with
schizophrenia. Psychological Medicine, 26, 521-530.
Johnstone, B., Callahan, C.D., Kapila, C.J., & Bouman, D.E. (1996). The comparability
of the WRAT-R reading test and NAART as estimates of premorbid intelligence
in neurologically impaired patients. Archives o f Clinical Neuropsychology, 11,
513-519.
Kraepelin, E. (1950). Dementia praecox and paraphrenia (J. Zinkin, Trans.). New York:
International Universities Press.
Klimidis, S., Stuart, G.W., Minas, I.H., Colpolov, D.L., & Singh, B.S. (1993). Positive
and negative symptoms in the psychoses: Re-analysis of published SAPS and
SANS global ratings. Schizophrenia Research, 9, 11-18.
Kulhara, P., Kota, S.K., & Joseph, S. (1986). Positive and negative subtypes of
schizophrenia. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 74, 353-359.

44
Liddle, P.F. (1987). The symptoms of chronic schizophrenia: A re-examination of the
positive-negative dichotomy. British Journal o f Psychiatry, 151, 145-151.
Lipsitz, J.D., Dworkin, R.H., & Erlenmeyer-Kimling, L. (1993). Wechsler
Comprehension and Picture Arrangement subtests and social adjustment.
Psychological Assessment, 5, 430-437.
Minas, I.H., Stuart, G.W., Klimidis, S., Jackson, H.J., Singh, B.S., & Copolov, D.L.
(1992). Positive and negative symptoms in the psychoses: Multidimensional
scaling of SAPS and SANS items. Schizophrenia Research, 8, 143-156.
Morrison, R.L., & Bellack, A.S. (1981). The role of social perception in social skill.
Behavior Therapy, 12, 69-79.
Mueser, K.T., Bellack, A.S., Douglas, M.S., & Morrison, R.L. (1991). Prevalence and
stability of social skill deficits in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research, 5, 167176.
Mueser, K.T., Bellack, A.S., Morrison, R.L., & Wixted, J.T. (1990). Social competence
in schizophrenia: Premorbid adjustment, social skill, and domains of functioning.
Journal o f Psychiatric Research, 24, 51-63.
Ott, S.L., Spinelli, S., Rock, D., Roberts, S., Amminger, G.P., & Erlenmeyer-Kimling, L.
(1998). The New York High Risk Project: Social and general intelligence in
children at risk for schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research, 31,
Penn, D.L., Combs, D., & Mohamed, S. (2001). Social cognition and social functioning
in schizophrenia. In P.W. Corrigan, & D.L. Penn (Eds.), Social cognition and
schizophrenia (pp.97-121). Washington, DC: American Psychological
Association.

45
Rowe, E.W., & Shean, G. (1997). Card-sort performance and syndromes of
schizophrenia. Genetic, Social, and General Psychology Monographs, 123, 197209.
Sarfati, Y., Hardy-Bayle, M.C., Besche, C., & Widloecher, D. (1997b). Attribution of
intentions to others in people with schizophrenia: A non-verbal exploration with
comic strips. Schizophrenia Research, 25, 199-209.
Sarfati, Y., Hardy-Bayle, M.C., Brunet, E., & Widloecher, D. (1999). Investigating
theory of mind in schizophrenia: Influence o f verbalization in disorganized and
non-disorganized patients. Schizophrenia Research, 37, 183-190.
Sarfati, Y., Hardy-Bayle, M.C., Nadel, J., Chevalier, J.F., & Widloecher, D. (1997a).
Attribution of mental states to others by schizophrenic patients. Cognitive
Neuropsychiatry, 2, 1-17.
Segal, H.G., Westen, D., Lohr, N.E., & Silk, K.R. (1993). Clinical assessment of object
relations and social cognition using stories told to the picture arrangement subtest
of the WAIS-R. Journal o f Personality Assessment, 61, 58-80.
Segal, H.G., Westen, D., Lohr, N.E., Silk, K.R., & Cohen, R. (1992). Assessing object
relations and social cognition in borderline personality disorders from stories told
to the picture arrangement subtest of the WAIS-R. Journal o f Personality
Disorders, 6, 458-470.
Shean, G., Burnett, T., & Eckman, F.S. (2002). Symptoms of schizophrenia and
neurocognitive test performance. Journal o f Clinical Psychology, 58, 723-731.
Snelbaker, A.J., Wilkinson, G.S., Robertson, G.J., & Glutting, J.J. (2001). Wide Range
Achievement Test 3 (WRAT 3). In Dorfman & Hersen (Eds.). Understanding

46
Psychological Assessment (pp. 259-274). New York: Kluwer Academic/ Plenum
Publishers.
Tam, W.C., Sewell, K.W., & Deng, H. (1998). Information processing in schizophrenia
and bipolar disorder: A discriminant analysis. Journal o f Nervous and Mental
Disease, 186, 597-603.
Toomey, R., Wallace, C.J., Corrigan, P.W., Schuldberg, D., & Green, M.F. (1997). Social
processing correlates of nonverbal social perception in schizophrenia. Psychiatry,
60, 292-300.
Walker, E., & Harvey, P. (1986). Positive and negative symptoms in schizophrenia:
Attentional performance correlates. Psychopathology, 19, 294-302.
Wechsler, D. (1981). Manual fo r the Wechsler adult intelligence scale- revised. New
York: Psychological Corporation.
Westen, D., & Segal, H.G. (1990). Coding dimensions o f object relations and social
cognition from stories told to the picture arrangement subtest o f the WAIS-R:
Scoring manual. Unpublished manuscript.
Wilkinson, G.S. (1993). Wide Range Achievement Test 3. Wilmington, DE: Wide Range,
Inc.

47
VITA
Ann Aileen Murphy
The author was bom in Morristown, NJ, April 2,1976. She graduated from
Ballard High School in Louisville, KY, May 1994. She then went on to graduate summa
cum laude from Susquehanna University in May 1998 with a B.A. in Psychology and
Philosophy. Following graduation, the author was employed as a mental health counselor,
working with adults with chronic mental illness. In August 2001 the author entered the
College of William and Mary to pursue a M.A. in Psychology. The author will graduate
in August 2003. During her time at William and Mary the author was a research assistant
at Eastern State Hospital.

